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AN ELECTRONIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY: 
HOUSE MEMBERS ON THEIR COMPUTERS 
Doug Murdoch 
April 25, 2015 
 This paper analyzes the use of the Twitter use of all House of Representative 
members in the 111th Congress. The data used is a secondary dataset originally created by 
Gainous and Wagner (2014). This paper aims to demonstrate the methods members of 
Congress to create a public image. In traditional campaign literature, campaign statements 
are divided into four mutually exclusive categories: positive competitive, negative 
competitive, substantive, and information dissemination. This paper seeks to add a fifth 
category to the discussion, the presentation of self. The presentation of self is not a 
traditional form of campaigning. Rather, it is the strategy used to maximize the personal 
vote. This paper investigates the degree to which Members of Congress use Twitter for 
these quasi-campaigning reputation building exercises, and seeks to find ways to predict 
the circumstances that cause Members of Congress to use Twitter for traditional 
campaigning purposes, and which circumstances cause members of Congress to use 
Twitter for the presentation of self. For simplicity, this paper simplifies the four 
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aforementioned campaign strategies into three, combining information dissemination and 
substantive messaging and calling this traditional campaigning. This paper considers, age, 
gender, geographic region, district competitiveness, experience and salience as explanatory 
variables.  This paper finds candidates use Twitter significantly more for negative 
competitive messaging when the candidate is unsafe in their reelection outcome and when 
their tweets reach a larger audience. Further, this paper finds that candidates use traditional 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 Members of Congress are often portrayed as being hyper partisan, calculating, and 
constantly campaigning. Two seminal works in the American Politics literature argue that 
candidates are not always purely rational vote-share maximizers (Mayhew 1974; Fenno 
2003).1 The theory that members of Congress find, “it is only reasonable [to] believe that 
whatever it was that won [the election] last time is good enough to win the next time” 
(Mayhew 1974: 47) is central to this paper. However, Mayhew’s hallowed words, 
combined with the reality that people are becoming more engaged in politics (Abramowitz 
2010), and incumbents are more likely to be challenged by a competitive primary challenge 
(Boatright 2014) leads to an interesting intersection in the American Politics literature.  
Does the decreased cost of political engagement in politics—and subsequent 
polarization—force the politician’s calculus to become more of a vote share maximizer?2 
                                                          
1 Mayhew does note that members of Congress are purely interested in reelection. Further, 
as Fowler and Smirnov (2007) find incumbent behavior does not significantly change with 
the vote margin. Further, Fenno (2003) makes the distinction between an expansionist 
phase and a protectionist phase in a member’s tenure. The expansionist phase is when 
members are trying to gather as much support as they can from whomever they can 
convince to support them. Members do this at the risk of alienating their core supporters. 
The protectionist phase, however, is the phase where members are almost content with 
their core of supporters and the members focus their concerns on their personal goals in 
Congress. 
2 It could be argued that Putnam (2000) has pointed out that civic engagement is on the 
decline and use that as an argument against any major effect on the politician’s calculus. 
However there are two major problems with this argument. The first criticism is on the 
grounds of definitions Burger (2011) notes that civic engagement is not a very useful 
term to use to study citizens’ attention to politics as it is overly broad. Second, as 
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If so, we would expect members of Congress to increase their energy in advertising, credit 
claiming, and position taking (Mayhew 1974: 73). Further, if the increased probability of 
a competitive primary challenger changes congressional behavior, how might a political 
scientist model the change? Finally, the most important research agenda for scholars of 
American Politics to undertake is one which acknowledges the influence of the Internet on 
political communication. The Internet has decreased the information cost that was keeping 
the public uninformed, while simultaneously decreasing the cost of campaigning.3The 
Internet has obviously both played a role in the increased polarization among the public, 
and has helped potential primary challengers. However, it is much less clear in the literature 
how the Internet affects congressional behavior.  
 This paper seeks to answer if we can determine a change in congressional behavior 
by Members of Congress’s Twitter accounts. If this reading of Mayhew and Fenno are 
correct, we will find that over the course of a congressional session not a great deal of 
energy is spent on gaining a relative advantage over their opponents by attacking their 
opponents or flaunting their qualifications.4 Rather, most of the time spent on the Internet 
by members of Congress will be more close to the median user’s internet practices. Most 
of the time, we expect, the members of Congress will be tweeting about their families, pets, 
and hobbies, rather than attacking their opponents on esoteric policy positions. I therefore 
expect to be able to code a significant amount of the tweets made by politicians as what 
                                                          
Abramowitz (2010) notes, citizens are becoming more engaged because of instant access 
to partisan media.  
3 Campaigning will be defined as spending time and energy on the three activities described 
by Mayhew (1974) and mentioned above—advertising, credit claiming, and position 
taking.  
4 Henceforth, this is described as “competitive campaigning.” Chapter 3 has a detailed 
explanation into the different types of competitive campaigning.  
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Fenno (2003) calls the presentation of self.5 I argue that politicians find more utility in this 
quasi-campaign reputation building method of tweeting, than using their Twitter as a pulpit 
to espouse their differences with their opponent.6The concept of candidate evaluation based 
on personal characteristics is not a new theory in the Political Science literature (Lodge, 
McGraw and Stroh, 1989; Fiorina 1981; Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina 1987; 1983; Cover 
1980; Miller, Wattenberg and Malanchuk 1986). This paper is investigating the degree to 
which candidates form their campaigning online about their personal characteristics.  
 To determine the share of candidate centered messaging, and how it relates to other 
forms of campaigning, I create a content analysis of all tweets made leading up to the 
election by members of Congress in the 111th congressional session. The dataset starts 6 
months prior to the election and continues until the Midterm election in November 2010. I 
will first code them in a way to determine the share of campaign statements made, 
compared to the share of statements made in an attempt to present oneself. I will also seek 
to determine whether the use of Twitter is used to replace traditional forms of campaigning 
in geographical regions. This is necessary to study because it is important to understand 
what costs each member of Congress weighs when constructing their digital persona.7 
Further considerations are made for the effect that gender, age, district competitiveness, 
candidate salience, and vote shares.  
                                                          
5 Fenno borrows this term from psychology literature, specifically Goffman (1959).  
6 Otherwise put, Twitter is significantly used for reputation building activities. In the frame 
of the present paper, that includes most of what is captured under the variable “Traditional 
Campaigning” and is precisely what is captured under the variable “Presentation of Self.” 
7  Although Fenno does not explicitly talk about geography, in the section where he 
discusses the presentation of self, he talks about members of Congress getting the most 
bang for their buck when describing one member of Congress’s decision to go on a photo 
op instead of shaking hands at a festival.  
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 This project tests two different hypotheses. The first deals with candidate salience 
and messaging strategy. I test to see if members who are more visible online use Twitter to 
avoid issue oriented tweeting.8 To test this, I hypothesize that high salience members use 
Twitter more for competitive messaging. Thus, high salience members attack their political 
adversaries and present themselves as strong partisan leaders more often than more 
marginal, less salient members. I ultimately reject this hypothesis. The data show little 
relationship between salience and competitive messaging. The results show that highly 
visible candidates use Twitter to attack their opponents and for traditional campaigning. 
However, if the model makes the distinction for only competitive campaigning—rather 
than for positive competitive and negative competitive—I find no significant results for 
competitive campaigning and reject hypothesis 1.  
 The second hypothesis I test is to determine whether the safety of the district has 
any determination on Twitter style. There is a strong literature, as discussed in Chapter 2, 
suggesting that district competitiveness does cause members to maximize their appeal 
based on their personal characteristics. However, the data do not support this argument. 
The data show no relationship between district safety and the presentation of self. However, 
the data do show a relationship between district safety and negative competitive messaging, 
a relationship that only has a weak support in the literature.   
 This paper shows that Twitter has not caught up to traditional candidate messaging 
tools, such as mass mailers, press releases, and email lists. Despite all logic, this paper does 
                                                          
8 When discussing the visibility of a candidate I use the term “candidate salience.” In 
chapters 2 and 3 I describe that salience is measured through PageRank, which is a metric 
of how often people link to a certain webpage.  
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not show that member use Twitter to enhance the interactions with constituents adding, 
what Fenno (1974) describes as, “the personal touch.” Members of Congress generally use 
Twitter similarly. When a candidate has a high degree of visibility, or high candidate 
salience, they tend to use Twitter for traditional campaigning and negative messaging. This 
is a consistent finding with Gainous and Wagner’s (2014) findings about the control of 
information with the by the use of external links and retweets.  However, Twitter as a 
campaign tool is still in its infancy and it is reasonable to expect that it will continue to 
evolve and researchers in the future will find results consistent to the literature.  
 Plan of the Thesis 
 The argument of the thesis is as follows: Chapter 2 provides a literature detailing 
current studies in relevant subfields of Political Science, and develops into the theory. 
Under the section “hypothesis definition” I give an extensive overview of the immediately 
relevant literature to the hypotheses, and provide detailed explanations of the results from 
the literature.  
For hypothesis 1, the effects that candidate salience has on campaign messaging, I 
draw from the literature on ambiguousness and candidate strategy. This literature leads to 
the hypothesis that candidates who reach a larger audience—candidates with a higher 
salience—are more likely to use Twitter for competitive campaign strategies. For 
hypothesis 2, the effects that district competitiveness has on campaign messaging. I draw 
from literature that looks explicitly into these exact effects. I thus draw the conclusion that 
marginal members are more likely to use the presentation of self.  
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 Chapter 3 deals with the definitions and methodology used in the thesis. In this 
chapter I define each variable and provide summary statistics. It is useful to provide a brief 
overview of the 4 variables I created. First, I make the classification of positive competitive 
campaigning, for a tweet to be considered positive competitive, it must be an attempt to 
frame the member as the holder of momentum or success. Positive competitive tweets 
make the member look more official as an office holder. The second classification I use is 
negative competitive. This classification counts the frequency that a member attacks their 
opponent, opposing party, opposing party’s leadership, or another entity they find 
unfavorable. The third, and most often used, classification of tweet is traditional 
campaigning. Traditional campaigning occurs when a member uses information 
dissemination or substantive issue-oriented activities. I frame this in Mayhew’s (1974) 
classic three electoral activities: Credit claiming, position taking, and advertising. The final 
classification is the presentation of self, which is an attempt to connect with the 
constituency, either through personal characteristics or casework.  
 Chapter 4 provides a more detailed summary statistic, where I find a number of 
positive relationships. For example, I find that younger members and more junior members 
are more likely to use positive competitive messaging. However, this relationship 
disappears when the variable tested for youth is changed to political experience. Similarly, 
I find Democrats significantly more likely to use competitive campaigning than their 
Republican counterparts.  
 Chapter 4 is also where I test the hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 I reject, as competitive 
campaigning is not used significantly more by members with a higher salience. Although, 
in Chapter 5, I suggest that the hypothesis might have been ill-construed and that my results 
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might actually corroborate the literature. I also reject hypothesis 2, as marginal members 
are actually more likely to use negative competitive messaging.  
 Finally, Chapter 5 is the concluding chapter. In this chapter I state potential 
limitations to the models and the scope of the project. I then suggest how this project fits 
in with the rest of the Political Science literature. I also suggest further avenues for research 

















CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Introduction: 
The literature review is a vital part to understand the basic theories that develop the 
model. In the literature review, I am primarily concerned with describing all theoretically 
relevant literature. This includes theories of political communication, political information, 
and theories of Internet politics. I break this chapter down into three sections, each one 
narrowing down to a more specific literature. The first section broadly details political 
communication online, and theories of how campaign information is processed by the 
media. In the next section, I discuss the significant literature that develops the theory. This 
includes a detailed look at the origins of the presentation of self, and candidate 
consciousness, followed by relevant definitions for the rest of the project. This chapter then 
concludes with an explicit stating of my hypotheses, and a close analysis of the 
immediately relevant literature.  
 Informative Literature: 
 The media model modern political scientists are tasked with studying are not as 
simple as the model Zaller (1992) studied.  Modern scholarship notes that people seek 
information that they agree with politically, and media sources are less likely to produce 
stories that go against their audience’s priors even if the media source believes it to be true 
(Arceneaux and Johnson 2013; Gentzkow and Shapiro 2006; Brundige and Rice 2009).  
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The grouping of consumers to partisan niche news sources by their priors has created, or 
exacerbated, polarization on the non-elite level of politics (Sunstein 2009; Abramowitz 
2010; Ensley 2012).9  This is a stark contrast to the two-sided distribution of information 
from the previous media model, which left non-elites apathetic and non-polarized 
(Converse 1964).  
 Gainous and Wagner (2014: 38) note that new models of media, specifically social 
media, allow consumers to create an “information bubble” where they do not ever have to 
hear a dissenting opinion. The bubble that consumers of political information reside 
challenges traditional candidate evaluation literature. 10  Ennsley (2012) notes that this 
information bubble provides incentives for candidates for public office to become more 
ideologically extreme on social media if there is sufficient ideological heterogeneity among 
their constituents. Ensley’s argument relies on the theory that divergence from the median 
voter increases mobilization of the core supporters.11  Mobilizing core supporters is a 
tradeoff against attracting undecided voters; however, the payoffs of mobilizing core 
supporters outweigh the costs in an ideologically diverse district because there are fewer 
voters surrounding the median voter.  
The link between media models and candidate messaging online is not immediately 
the consumer of the candidates’ messaging. Rather, it is more of a trickle down effect and 
the link lies with the ways the media itself uses candidates’ online communication. The 
literature on the media using candidate communication begins with Terkildsen, Frauke and 
                                                          
9 See Ensley (2012) for a theoretical look at how polarization is used in House Elections. 
10 For an analysis of traditional models of candidate evaluation, see Lodge, Steenbergen 
and Brau (1995). 
11 Downs (1957) made a similar argument about candidate positioning. 
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Ling (1998) who note that the media frames its coverage of events in the framework they 
are presented. Flowers, Haynes and Crespin (2003) provide a model of candidates using 
campaign releases for the purpose of media attention that corroborates Terkildsen, Frauke 
and Ling’s account. Analysis for online research is not so clear cut. For online research, 
Hong and Nadler (2012) test the relationship between Twitter use and candidate salience. 
Using Twitter mentions as a measure for salience, their results show that the number of 
times a candidate uses Twitter does not have an impact on the candidate’s salience. 
However, media mentions of the candidate increases candidate salience significantly.   
The aggregate effects of online campaigning have been studied more thoroughly 
than political campaigning’s effects on the overall media. Nevertheless, current studies on 
the Internet and politics do not provide a conclusive theory about the specific impact of the 
Internet. Nevertheless, two interesting studies show the motivations and efficacy of Twitter 
usage for campaigning. Peterson (2012) provides the first basic model of candidate 
communication on Twitter. Using data from the 111th Congress, Peterson shows that in the 
early stages of twitter Republicans were more likely to be active Twitter. In a similar study 
on Facebook, Gulati and Williams (2013) repeat a similar narrative. Younger candidates 
and marginal members are more likely to adopt Facebook as a means for campaigning. 
However, Gulati and Williams do not find a difference in party and Facebook adoption. 
Wagner, Gainous, and Holman (2014) show that Republican women use Twitter 
effectively to overcome negative perceptions about their candidacy.12 Thus, Wagner et al 
find Republican women to be more active, more likely to attack, and more likely to find 
                                                          
12 It also must be noted that Gainous and Wagner (2014) find that out of power groups 
are more likely to adopt Twitter.  
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higher vote shares from of negative styles of tweeting. This finding corroborates Shogun’s 
(2010) study that concludes that the minority party is more likely to use Twitter more 
frequently. Interestingly, Shogun predicts that the constant communication with the age of 
the Internet will lead to a higher turnover of high level staff members.  
In Internet research’s extreme infancy, Roberts, Wanta and Dzwo (2002) find that 
the media has agenda setting effects on electronic bulletin boards. They found that the 
discussion among individuals on electronic bulletin boards is heavily reliant on the issues 
the news media is reporting on. These results are so dated that they are only considered 
lightly as relevant to the present study. However, their research does beg for further, more 
updated research to be done on the subject: Does Twitter provide agenda-setting impact, 
or does the news media dictate the issues discussed online? Hong and Nadler’s (2012) 
results suggest that news media still dictates the agenda, consistent with Roberts, Wanta 
and Dzwo (2002). 
An important segue for scholars interested in social media are social networks. 
This, of course, is not social networks in the colloquial, online, sense. However, this 
literature discusses interpersonal networks. In a study of political participation online, 
Brundidge and Rice (2009) find that “the rich get richer.”13 The flow of information online 
is more likely to be used by those with higher socioeconomic status, Brundidge and Rice 
find by analyzing survey data. However, Brundidge and Rice suggest argue that online 
political discussion “contribute[s] slightly to the heterogeneity of political discussion 
networks” (Brundidge and Rice 2009: 154). If social networking sites create more 
                                                          
13 The name of their chapter, I am not citing a specific use of the term within the chapter. 
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heterogeneous social networks, there are potentially positive externalities. As Huckfeldt, 
Mendez and Osborn (2004) find that individuals with that witness more political 
disagreement—individuals who reside in heterogeneous networks—are more likely to 
have more informed opinions on political candidates.  
An interesting study on social networks generalizable to social media, Ryan (2011) 
uses Lau and Redlawsk’s (1997) study of correct voting, experiments to see how social 
networks can lead to a greater amount of correct voting. However, Ryan makes an 
important distinction from Lau and Redlawsk. Lau and Redlawsk roughly define voting 
correctly as making the same choice as one would under full information (Lau and 
Redlawsk 1995: 586). Ryan, on the other hand, defines voting correctly as the vote which 
receives the maximum payoff (Ryan 2011: 755). This may or may not be a problem 
depending on one’s opinion on rational choice theory, as Ryan is assuming that a voter 
with full information would not chose to vote altruistically. The definition discrepancy 
does not have a significant impact on Ryan’s results. Ryan’s results were mixed. Informed 
partisans were most influenced by those with whom they were communicating and it was 
unclear if this had a positive or negative effect, where social networks helped uninformed 
partisans vote correctly.14   
Nevertheless, in the context of the present project, it is irrational to consider the 
effect that Congressional tweeting has on discussion networks. Social networks of political 
discussion are far more complex than can be analyzed in the scope of this project. Families, 
friends, work relationships, and socioeconomic backgrounds are all unquantifiable in the 
                                                          
14 Ryan’s results corroborate Abramowitz’s (2010) argument about political engagement.  
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current context.15 Thus, it makes most sense to look at the supply side—the Members 
themselves—as any argument over the actual effect on individuals would be spurious. Still, 
this literature is important, as it provides insight into communication based voter behavior.  
  Thus far, I have given a brief overview of the relationship between online 
campaigning and the media, along with a brief description of the consumption of the 
product of online campaigning and the media. For the present project, this is most useful 
for hypothesis 1—stated fully below—that investigates the relationship that the visibility 
of the candidate’s online persona has on the type of messaging utilized. The literature 
described above provides a brief understanding into what goes into the strategic 
calculations made by candidates. 
 Specific literature: 
Discussion on the literature specific to the overall theory and the definitions made 
in chapter 3 must begin with a discussion on constituency contact. The defining works on 
constituency contact and constituency service are Fenno (2003, 2000). Fenno (2003)16 uses 
a qualitative analysis of members’ communications with their constituencies. To make 
these inductions, Fenno traveled with many Members of Congress as they traveled in their 
districts. Fenno defines four different constituencies: Geographic, reelection, primary, and 
personal. The geographic constituency is the size and demographics of the constituency. In 
the perception of the Member of Congress, according to Fennno, the geographical 
                                                          
15 For an overview of social networks—different from social network websites, such as 
Twitter—see Zuckerman (2005) is the most comprehensive volume for these micro-level 
effects.   
16 I am using the Longman Classics reprint. Home Style was originally published in 1978. 
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constituency is simply a nonpolitical geographical space. The reelection constituency is a 
narrower constituency of the Member’s supporters and potential supporters. In a smaller 
sphere, is what Fenno calls the primary constituency. These are the major supporters, the 
political elites, and the most reliable base for the member. Finally, the personal 
constituency is the member’s inner most circle. The personal constituency is the group that 
the Member will share meals with to discuss strategy. The personal constituency is also the 
group of individuals that the Member will spend free time with and relax with.  
The most important argument in Fenno’s work (2003) to understand is trust and the 
home style. Trust, is one of the main goals in the presentation of self.17 Fenno stresses, 
“Presentation of self enhances trust; enhancing trust takes time; therefore, presentation of 
self takes time” (Fenno 2003: 56). To earn trust, Members exhibit three types of behaviors: 
qualification, identification, and empathy.  Qualification is most vital for nonincumbents, 
to show that they will be reliable and competent in office. Moreover, Fenno notes that a 
smaller component of qualification is honesty. However honesty is earned through the sum 
of the other components of the presentation of self. The second component, identification, 
is simply the way in which members show that they are just like their constituents. This 
includes, “habits of speech…contextually appropriate humor” and identifying factors such 
as religion or cultural sensitivity (Fenno 2003: 58). The final component of trust is 
empathy. This is when a member shows that he or she cares.  When members use 
identification and empathy, constituents trust the member because they: “are like one 
                                                          
17 The presentation of self is briefly introduced in Chapter 1 of this project, and is defined 
at length in chapter 3. I do not spend a lot of time discussing Fenno’s presentation of self 
in the literature review, because I amend his definition in Chapter 3 to capture a more 
specific type of behavior.  
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another… [and they] understand you” (Fenno 2003:59-60).18 This is a purposeful strategy 
aimed at ensuring support, as Fenno describes when discussing the expansionist phase.   
The trust maximizing strategies mentioned above are just one component of the 
home style. To Fenno—and subsequently, the rest of the Political Science discipline— 
home style is the sum of the presentation of self, explanation of Washington activities, and 
the allocation of resources. The explanation of Washington activities is simply the way in 
which members relate policy and politics to their constituents. Similarly, the allocation of 
resources is the way in which members budget their time and attentiveness to their district 
and constituents.   
In almost a supplemental text, Fenno (2000) analyzes the same district in Western 
Georgia over approximately 30 years. Fenno’s expansive case study chronicles the changes 
of home style. Fenno shows that the calculation of person oriented, and policy oriented 
changes based on the circumstances. Fenno shows that during the expansionist phase—the 
phase when the member is trying to gain the widest share of support—is the trust 
maximization stage of the service. 
The next specific pieces of literature necessary for the development of the theory 
are simply the literature associated with the definition of the variables. Although my 
definitions are not exactly the same, the actual categories of the variables, with the 
exception of the presentation of self, come from Flowers, Haynes and Crespin (2003). The 
variables are: positive competitive, negative competitive, traditional campaign, and the 
                                                          
18 I categorize identification and empathy differently than qualification. I give a brief 
explanation in Chapter 3 when discussing the coding of variables. For a more complete 
explanation, see chapter 5.  
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presentation of self.  I define positive competitive as a message that makes the candidate 
appear to be in control, and deserving of support. It basically boils down to candidates 
tweeting about their endorsements, qualifications, and position in the polls. These tweets 
are intended to gain a relative advantage on their opponent.  
The next style of messaging, negative competitive, is defined as an attack. The 
member can be attacking an individual, an organization, the opposing party and its 
leadership, and other undesirable entities. The literature on the effectiveness of using this 
style of messaging is inconclusive.  In a meta-analysis  Lau, Sigelman and Rovner (2007) 
find little evidence to suggest that negative competitive messaging is a rational strategy. 
However, Gainous, Wagner, and Holman (2014) show that going negative on Twitter helps 
out-of-power groups.  
For the next variable, traditional campaigning, I basically combine information 
dissemination and substantive messaging. I find it most useful to focus this through 
Mayhew’s (1974) three electorally oriented activities: advertising, position taking, and 
credit claiming. Advertising, insofar as the present paper is concerned, is simply members 
broadcasting events or campaign literature. Position taking and credit claiming are also 
very simple. Position taking is when a candidate makes a substantive statement on a policy 
or issue, and credit claiming is when a candidate takes credit for providing a benefit to his 
or her constituents.  
The presentation of self has largely been discussed above with the discussion of 
Fenno. However, to be completely explicit, the presentation of self is a candidate centered 
campaign style used to increase vote share by making the member look more favorable to 
17 
 
their constituents. Apart from Fenno’s discussion on the same topic, Fiorina’s (1981) tally 
theory is especially important. Fiornia argues that voters get information about a candidate 
and make positive or negative tallies in their head to assess the candidate. The tallies can 
be made on anything, regardless of its political relevance.  This is how voters are able to 
respond to questions about their feelings of a certain member. I also consider the definition 
of Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina (1987; 1983) when they describe the personal vote, which 
is the vote on a member based on their personal characteristics.   
Finally, it is important to understand recent trends in electoral politics to understand 
the incentive structure of candidates. There are two major recent trends that began right 
before the time of the dataset. The first is increased polarization among the masses. The 
most convincing account of mass polarization is Abramowitz (2011). The argument is 
simple; informed citizens are more likely to be polarized, and the cost of information is 
decreasing significantly. Thus, the cost of being an informed citizen is lower. Arceneaux 
and Johnson (2013) provide a similar argument.  
I am more interested in the recent phenomenon of legitimate primary opponents 
(Boatright 2014). Boatright (2014, 2011) shows that incumbents are being primaried by a 
strategic coordination of interest groups, namely Club for Growth and MoveOn.org. For 
the present project, I am interested in the effects this has on incumbent messaging. There 
are no recent studies to the exact effects of Boatright’s analysis. The closest understanding 
comes from experimental studies on primary behavior. As Tullock notes, “If more than 
two parties or candidates are expected, then the vote-maximizing position is not close to 
your opponents, but well away from them” (Tullock 1967:55). This is confirmed by Cooper 
and Munger (2000) who run a simulation and find a huge variance in the winners of 
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primaries.19 Their most relevant finding is that candidate characteristics20 “are no more 
important than spatial location” (Cooper and Munger 2000:351).This is important to 
understand, understanding the location of the vote-maximizing position provides insight 
into the incentives for position taking. If, as Tullock—and to an extent Downs (1957) and 
Ensley (2012)—posits the position taking motivations are to provide candidate divergence 
(rather than simply to inform the constituents of policy preferences) it increases the 
probability for members to choose position taking as a campaign messaging.  
This specific literature leads to the hypotheses. The hypotheses draw from two 
different literatures. The first hypothesis, regarding candidate salience and candidate 
messaging, draws from a rich experimental literature about the incentives of ambiguous 
messaging. The second hypothesis, regarding district competitiveness and candidate 
messaging, draws from an empirical body of literature that studies the effects that district 
safety has on constituent contact.  
Hypothesis Definition:  
Hypothesis 1: The more salient the member, the more likely he or she is to tweet 
using competitive campaigning. 
The literature on hypothesis 1 is limited. Most of the literature about candidate 
salience stems from Shepsle (1972) and Glazer (1990). The most relevant literature on 
hypothesis 1 also includes Berliant and Konishi (2005), Alesina and Cukierman (1999), 
                                                          
19 Their standard deviation is 27, when the values are on a 0-100 scale.  
20 Candidate characteristics are defined as everything other than fundraising prowess, 
momentum, and organizational ability. 
19 
 
and Glazer and Lohmann (1999). All these papers are looking at positional ambiguity; or, 
the strategy of individual members taking a position on salient or nonsalient issues. I am 
interested on the salience of members and if they alter their strategy compared to the other 
members. For the purpose of this paper, salience is defined as visibility—the more salient 
a member is, the more likely a viewer of political information is to come across that 
member’s page. Thus, I use PageRank, which is a measure of the visibility of a certain page 
to the random user of the Internet.  Although none of these papers frame their analysis in a 
way that is consistent with hypothesis 1, Shepsle (1972) is the most relevant.  
Shepsle’s model tests the Downsian argument on ambiguity that states candidates 
are encouraged to be ambiguous, as it increases the number of sympathetic voters (Downs 
1957). The Downsian argument is a simple three-pronged argument: First, ambiguity 
increases the number of voters who may find the candidate appealing because there is a 
lower probability of offending someone while being ambiguous. Second, because 
ambiguity increases the number of potential voters, candidates are incentivized to be as 
ambiguous as possible on polarizing issues. Finally, and least relevant Downs argues, that 
ambiguousness detracts from voter rationality. Therefore, candidates and parties are 
rational to be ambiguous. In an experimental model, Shepsle (1972) shows that incumbents 
must be less ambiguous with their policy positions than their challengers. This gives an 
advantage to the incumbents as voters must be risk takers in order for unambiguous 
candidates to have a successful campaign (Shepsle, 1972: 564).  
To this end, Shepsle does not support Downs’ ambiguous hypothesis, arguing that 
ambiguous strategies are irrational, as it leaves the member disadvantaged to a “median-
adopting, nonequivocating” candidate. However, if voters do accept a degree of risk and 
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hold “intense preferences,” an equivocating strategy is optimal (Shepsle, 1974: 567). 
Shepsle’s findings are critically important to hypothesis 1, as I am looking to find whether 
candidate strategies are different depending on their salience. Shepsle’s findings, however, 
do not provide direction for the prediction of results to the hypothesis. An extension of his 
argument, leads me to hypothesize that more salient members have stronger incentive to 
be ambiguous because their communication reaches a larger audience, and therefore 
offending voters with their preferences is more costly than it is for members with lower 
salience. Therefore members who are highly visible have a stronger incentive to make the 
election about their qualifications and the ineptitudes of their opponents. 
Following Shepsle’s work, Glazer (1990) criticizes Shepsle for assuming that the 
candidate has sufficient understanding of the preferences of the median voter. Therefore, 
both candidates have an incentive to be ambiguous. According to Glazer, the incentives to 
be ambiguous are two-fold; first, equivocal candidates are less likely to state an unpopular 
opinion. Second, and more importantly, stating a definite position allows the other 
candidate to gauge the preferences of the median voter. If Glazer’s model is generalizable 
to Twitter use, there would be an expectation that issue-oriented Tweeting—which falls 
under the traditional campaigning variable—will be lower than other forms of 
campaigning.  
Alesina and Cukierman (1990) provide a conclusion similar to Glazer (1990); 
however they operate under a different set of assumptions. Alesian and Cukierman show 
that ambiguity allows for members to take advantage of tradeoffs. However, “converging” 
on the ideologically preferred position of the party gives the member a higher chance of 
appointment to a prominent position. Thus the preferred strategy is one that obscures the 
21 
 
member’s absolute preferences, but allows for the member to manipulate agencies for 
partisan gains. This paper’s contribution to hypothesis 1 is critical, as it provides an explicit 
formal model of members balancing partisan preferences and ambiguous messaging. In the 
context of the 2010 midterm election, a bitterly polarizing election, the ambiguous 
messaging for Democrats would have been to avoid the polemical campaigns against 
Democratic initiatives, despite the partisan benefits. However, conversely, the 
Republican’s ambiguous messaging would be to attack the Democratic Party, rather than 
developing an alternative narrative. The partisan considerations shown by Alesina and 
Cukierman provide the most important incentive for frontrunners to deviate from the 
ambiguous norms.  
Berliant and Konishi (2005) provide a model critical to Glazer (1990) showing 
formally that underdogs have incentives to be unequivocal in order to drive voter turnout. 
To demonstrate their theory, Berlaint and Konishi describe ambiguous messaging over gun 
control. Their premise is simple: Gun control is an issue many people care about, voting is 
costly, and therefore if voters care about gun control, they will be more likely to vote when 
gun control is highly salient.21  
 Glazer and Lohmann provide a small deviation to the above literature showing that 
incumbents have an incentive to take salient issues “off the agenda even though the voter 
would prefer to be given a choice between different candidates” (Glazer and Lohmann, 
                                                          
21 For additional reading on candidate positioning, Ensley (2012) provides a particularly 
interesting model about centering positioning near the extremes.  
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1999: 391). These theories of ambiguity provide an interesting starting point to understand 
messaging strategies and how they relate to salience.  
The theory that lead me to investigate the literature described above comes from 
Mayhew’s (1974) discussion on how members choose committees for their personal 
electoral ambitions. Members who have high committee assignments relevant to more than 
their constituencies must be able to discuss issues plainly in order to relate to their 
constituencies. Further, as Mayhew mentions, committee allocations remain “ambiguous 
enough to allow members to claim personal credit” (pgs. 90-91). Therefore, I hypothesize 
that the salient members use credit claiming as a positive competitive strategy, where their 
less salient counterparts use credit claiming as a “traditional campaign” strategy. Credit 
claiming qua credit claiming is a form of traditional campaign. However, credit claiming 
can be coded as positive competitive, as shown in Chapter 3. The difference in the 
messaging strategies being, traditional campaign strategies that include credit claiming 
discuss their specific constituencies and their own involvement. Positive competitive credit 
claiming strategies are more nationally focused and equivocal to their involvement.  
This leads to interesting avenues for additional research. Do senior members 
assume the role of incumbents as described by Shepsle (1972) in time of non-campaign 
political conflict? Can the dichotomy of ambiguity and unequivocal be measured in an 
empirical model?  
 Hypothesis 2: Members in unsafe districts are more likely to use the presentation 
of self.  
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 The literature for hypothesis 2 is much more direct and expansive than the literature 
for hypothesis 1. The main source for the theory I test comes from Cain, Ferejohn and 
Fiorina (1987, 1983). Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiornina are interested in capturing what they 
describe as the personal vote.22  Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina describe the personal vote as 
“support…[for their]…personal qualities, qualifications, activities, and record” (Cain, 
Ferejon and Firorina 1987:9). The utility of maximizing the personal vote for marginal 
members, they argue, is to minimize negative swings in the electorate’s mood, and to 
augment positive swings in the electorate’s mood.  Cain, Ferejohn and Fironina look at 
constituency service in Great Britain and the United States and find that members are 
significantly more likely to reach out for casework when they are on the margins for 
reelection.  
To model this, Cain, Ferejohn and Fiornia look at NES and CPS survey results on 
questions about the nature of constituency contact. Most of the questions were related to 
how the member’s responded to communication initiated by the constituents. The argument 
forward is simple; constituents satisfied with the responses to their communications are 
more likely to vote favorably and to speak favorably about the member. More marginal 
members are more likely to have a quicker turn around, and to have higher level of 
satisfaction, and over the course of an election, the member receives a higher vote share. 
Further, based on interviews with Representatives’ staff members, Cain, Ferejohn, and 
Fiorina find that roughly two thirds of Members in the United States and Great Britain 
                                                          
22 “The Personal Vote” is the name of their 1987 book. The description and analysis of the 
phrase the personal vote is from the introduction chapter of Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorinia 
(1987) specifically pages 9-21. 
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advertise their constituent service. Subsequent literature, including the present project, test 
the methods used to advertise the constituency service, to sway the personal vote. 
 Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina’s work closely relates to Cover (1980) who shows that 
the use of constituency contact—by mass mailings—is pursued most aggressively by 
marginal members and by inexperienced members, although Cover does not discuss what 
members are saying in their mass mailings. From these two studies, the theory is formed 
that members in competitive districts, and members with worse expected vote shares, are 
going to reach out to their constituency more. This is not a new theory; all I am doing is 
testing to determine whether Twitter is a method used for this constituency contact that 
Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina describe.  
In more of a popular science piece, Epstein and Frankovic (1982) use survey data 
of incumbent members of Congress, district competitiveness data, and employment 
numbers at district offices to determine the amount of attention spent in the home district. 
Their results corroborate the results of Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina (1987,1983) and the 
results of Cover (1980), finding that unsafe and younger members were more likely to have 
larger district offices. Further, Epstein and Frankovic find members in hostile districts 
correlated with attentiveness to district demands.  
In a modern and more significant study, Adler, Gent and Overmeyer (1998) 
specifically look at how members of the House of Representative express their political 
home styles. Their results show that members in more affluent districts, Republicans, and 
marginal members use the Internet for constituency contact. Conversely, Democrats and 
marginal members are more likely to use the Internet for soliciting casework.  Their 
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analysis, from 1998, was intended to determine the conditions present for a member to 
have a campaign website. Therefore, the affluence finding is no longer relevant, as the 
costs of getting online are significantly lower. Their findings about home styles, however, 
are extremely important to the present paper. They conclude, that “casework content” is 
solely based on party and electoral uncertainty. With this literature, it is perplexing why I 
reject hypothesis 2.  
Interestingly, however, Arceneaux and Johnson (2013) note that in recent years 
parties are contacting constituents at a drastically higher rate than they were at the time of 
the literature cited above. Arceneaux and Johsnon note, “almost 45 percent of voters in the 
[2010 election] report having been directly contacted by at least one of the major political 
parties” (Arceneaux and Johnson 2013:155). This is a shift in narrative from older studies 
on constituency contact that concludes party significance is on the decline (Huckfeldt and 
Sprague 1992; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Wattenberg 1998).23 Arceneaux and Johnson 
use this finding as an inquiry into polarization. However, this party-centric finding might 
provide insight into the results of hypothesis 2. For example, candidates might tweet at a 
higher rate for competitive campaign messaging because parties have a much stronger 
organizational infrastructure than individual candidates, which decreases the benefits of 
candidate’s organizational structures.24 This, therefore, provides insight into why negative 
competitive campaigning was significant, and the presentation of self held no relationship.  
                                                          
23 In contrast, Cain, Ferejohn and Firorina (1987:52) find that only 15% of people reported 
being contacted by a representative or a representative’s office.  
24 I am not claiming that the absence of benefit for candidates to grow their 
organizational strength. However, I am simply claiming that party involvement 





CHAPTER THREE: DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Methods: 
 The data are broken down into four categories, positive competitive, negative 
competitive, traditional campaign, and the presentation of self. Existing literature largely 
categorizes campaign messaging into two main categories, competitive and substantive 
(Haynes, Flowers and Gurian 2002; Flowers, Haynes and Crespin 2003; Bowler and Farrell 
1992). My metrics are consistent with the existing literature. The positive competitive and 
negative competitive are to be seen as “competitive” campaign messaging, and traditional 
campaigning is to be seen as “substantive” campaign messaging.  
The data are drawn from the tweets of all incumbents in the House of 
Representatives of the 111th Congress that ran for re-election in 2010. The data covers the 
final 6 months of the session. In whole, there 180 members analyzed. Over the time of the 
dataset, there were 15,036 tweets recorded. On average, members tweeted 79.98 times with 







Plot 1, Total Tweets by Member  
 
Systematic samples of each third tweet were manually coded into the four 
categories. Before reading tweets by each candidate, I did a google search to learn the 
context surrounding each campaign. Most searches were limited to “[Member Name] 2010 
Campaign” however some searches required more research. I added up the total number of 
tweets used in each category and calculated the percentage for each category to determine 
the relative frequency of the each category. To account for inter-rater reliability, I 
distributed a random selection of 20% of the data to an outside reader along with the 
descriptions of each category below. To ensure that the data were selected randomly, I 
listed the names in alphabetical order and assigned each name a numeric value and used a 
random number generator to determine which data the outside reader would consider. The 
outside hand coded the data as if they were producing their own dataset. From this coding, 
I calculated the Scott’s Pi (π=0.81), as proscribed by Neuendorf (2001). There are no 
subcategories hand coded.  
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Evidence already exists predicting which demographics use Twitter, and to a 
degree, how each demographic uses Twitter (Gainous and Wagner 2009, 2014, Wagner, 
Gainous, and Holman 2014; Peterson 2012).  Further evidence exists for how candidates 
try to manipulate the media through campaign releases depending on the level of safety of 
retaining their seat (Flowers, Haynes, and Crespin, 2003).  This evidence will be tested 
against the data. Peterson (2012) provides a generalizable model of what motivates 
members of Congress to use Twitter, and is applied to the data to see if the construction of 
Twitter usage has remained constant.  
 Positive Competitive 
 Tweets coded into the positive competitive category are tweets where the candidate 
is seen as the initiator of some conflict with their opponent. Indeed, competitive messaging 
in the literature is sometimes referred to as war messaging. Positive competitive tweets, 
therefore, are tweets where a candidate proclaims a degree of success. Flowers, Haynes 
and Crespin (2003) describe positive competitive messages as, “…attempts to frame the 
candidate as the leader or as endowed with momentum” (260). This includes tweets where 
the member of congress is mentioning an endorsement, their position in the reelection 
campaign, the result of policies the member supported, and the result of bills the member 
was involved in. Further, tweets that are meant to make the member look more official, or 
tweets where a member piggybacks onto more salient members are also coded as positive 
competitive. Below I have selected a few examples of tweets that belong in positive 
competitive, along with a discussion of why each tweet fits in the category. These tweets 
only rarely will mention the opponents name or positions, or the name and positions of the 
other party.   
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  Examples 
 1. Albio Sires 
We passed a bill today to expand lending and offer tax 
incentives to millions of small businesses. Thursday, 
September 23, 2010 4:22:45 PM via TweetDeck 
 
 Albio Sires, a Democrat, only had been in congress since 2006, and despite the anti-
incumbent and anti-democrat political climate of 2010, earned a 74% vote share. The above 
tweet came fewer than 2 months prior to the election, and is a perfect example of a positive 
competitive tweet because it shows the passing of a bill that he was involved in. The bill 
he is referring to is H.R. 5297, or the Small Business Lending Fund Act of 2010.25 In large 
part, this bill was intended to help small businesses expand and add jobs. However, the 
“we” in this tweet is referring to the House as a whole. Representative Sires was not a 
Sponsor or a Cosponsor of the bill, although Representative Sires did vote in favor of the 
bill (U.S. Library of Congress). This is important as a positive competitive example 
because Representative Sires framed the bill as a way to pander to his more fiscally 
conservative constituents by mentioning the tax incentives given to the small businesses.  
 2. Dean Heller 
                                                          
25  Talking about the same bill, Adam Smith—a democrat in a tight race in Western 
Washington—tweeted, “NEARLY $20 MILLION ANNOUNCED FOR SMALL 
BUSINESS LENDING IN WASHINGTON STATE http://bit.ly/bREv8c 3:07 PM Oct 8th 
via web”. This is also an example of positive competitive, but not as strong of an example 




I am deeply saddened to hear of the death of Governor 
Guinn. I was proud to have called him my friend. 2:09 PM 
Jul 22nd via HootSuite 
 
 Dean Heller is a different case than Albio Sires; Representative Heller worked as 
the Secretary of State in Nevada 12 years before moving on to the House of 
Representatives. The governor Heller worked under, Governor Guinn, was largely a 
popular governor and was succeeded by another Republican governor. This tweet was from 
July, when Representative Heller was facing a primary challenger. This tweet legitimizes 
Heller’s role as a statesman, and reminds his constituents of his relationship with the now-
late former governor.  
 3. George Miller 
Proud to say that I received a 100% rating from the Leadership 
Conference on Civil Rights on their scorecard for... 
http://fb.me/KyOxbKOo Friday, October 29, 2010 2:42:46 PM via 
Facebook 
 
 George Miller is a Democrat from California’s 11th district. The 11th district is 
largely smaller municipalities within Oakland. George Miller, had been in congress since 
1974. This is an example of positive competitive because Representative Miller’s district 
is extremely racially diverse. George Miller is also old and white. Miller invokes his rating 
on Civil Rights because it acts as an endorsement from an authority on civil rights. This is 
an example of positive competitive campaigning because Representative Miller is showing 
his constituents that he is the best available defender of a salient issue. 
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 4. Aaron Schock 
Grateful for the @pjstar endorsement today 
http://bit.ly/cK2xPK Sunday, October 24, 2010 8:20:29 AM 
via web 
 
 This is simply an example of a representative using Twitter to relay a prestigious 
endorsement—in this case, the local newspaper—to the voters. Context is not required to 
categorize this tweet as positive competitive.  
    Potential Sources of Variation 
 Positive competitive is very similar to what I am capturing in the measurement of 
traditional campaigning. In a vacuum, Albio Sires’ tweet could reasonably be considered 
credit claiming. Indeed, Sires is taking credit for participating in a roll call vote that is 
intended at giving a benefit to his community. This is why it is important to realize the 
context; Sires was not a major proponent of the bill, Sires did not claim any specific 
particularized benefit to the community, and Sires in a campaign against a Republican.  
Further, the Dean Heller tweet could reasonably be coded as what I am trying to 
capture under the Presentation of Self. Heller is focusing on a local issue, discussing a local 
figure, and mentioning a personal relationship. This is true; however, Heller’s competitor 
in the election—Nancy Price—was an academic with little political experience, and 
Heller’s competitor in the primary—Patrick Colletti—was a pediatrician with no political 





The most simple of categories, negative competitive tweets are tweets where the 
candidate is attacking something. This includes attacks on issues, candidates, and 
campaigns. These tweets are typical negative messaging. Often times, the candidate 
mentions members of the opposing party, especially the leadership. Almost all tweets 
mentioning a challenger were coded as negative competitive. The mention of the other 
party was also a key factor in coding a message as negative competitive. Many members 
try to veil their attacks by using the truth. For example, many members attack their 
opponents for saying something that is false or misleading. The key component of a 
negative competitive message is that it is used for relative gains at the expense of someone 
or something else. In some cases, Republican members will tweet the current U.S. debt. As 
above, there are examples below of a few key examples of negative competitive messaging.  
 Examples 
1. Nancy Pelosi 
RT@politifact on Cantor's spending claim on 
@TheDailyShow: "it's not just wrong--it's ridiculously 
false" http://bit.ly/dnTsVA Wednesday, October 27, 2010 
12:59:08 PM via web  
 This is a case where the Speaker of the House, and perhaps the most salient member 
of the 111th Congress, uses negative competitive messaging towards a candidate that she is 
not in a campaign against. In this case, Representative Pelosi is retweets a negative message 
about a member of the Republican leadership. This meets the requirements for a negative 
competitive message; it is gives Representative Pelosi an advantage over her Republican 
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challenger by making the Republican Party look bad, and it mentions the leadership of the 
Republican Party by name.  
  2. Tim Murphy 
Remember being told you could keep your #health 
plan? Think again. http://tinyurl.com/24ncram 
#healthcare 1:13 PM Jun 14th via web  
 
 Tim Murphy is a Republican from Western Pennsylvania who received two thirds 
of the vote share in 2010 election. Without mentioning either by name, Representative 
Murphy is attacking President Obama, and the Affordable Care Act. This fits as a negative 
competitive message, as it is both attacking an issue and an individual.  
  3. John Boehner 
Co-founder of Home Depot says businesses like his "would 
never have gotten off the ground" under Obama policies 
http://is.gd/g3dBj Friday, October 15, 2010 2:43:02 PM via 
HootSuite 
 
 Similarly to Representative Pelosi, Representative Boehner has a fairly politically 
homogenous district, and is one of the most salient members of the House of 
Representatives. In this tweet, Representative Boehner is using a business owner to attack 
the policies of the Obama administration.  




Potential Sources of Variation 
 Negative competitive is the most exclusive category analyzed. Most tweets can be 
looked at as positive, neutral, or negative. If the tweet is positive or neutral, there must be 
context and tone to determine which category the tweet belongs to; similarly, if the tweet 
is negative, it has to be negative competitive. However, tweets advertising appearances on 
national television, or in person, where the candidate is going to use negative competitive 
messaging, is a source of variation. For example, in July, Trent Franks—a Republican from 
Arizona—tweeted this, 
On Fox News discussing possibility of states using federal 
funds to pay for abortions under Obamacare: 
http://bit.ly/b0jZL0 4:33 PM Jul 19th via web 
 This tweet is not directly attacking a policy or person; rather, it is advertising a 
television opportunity. One can tell by the tweet, that Representative Frank intends on 
attacking the Democrats and President Obama. The tweet even leads the reader to think of 
an imminent possibility of federal funds being appropriated to fund abortions.  However, 
advertising is a key component of what I intend to capture under “traditional campaigning.” 
I therefore, believe that Representative Franks’ tweet, and tweets like it, are to be counted 
as traditional campaigning. Representative Franks’ tweet is more similar to the following 
Aaron Schock tweet, than to any of the tweets above:  
As seen on MSNBC http://bit.ly/dadVxC Thursday, October 
14, 2010 12:27:13 PM via web  
 Further sources of variation might occur with position taking—another key 
component for traditional campaigning. John Boehner tweeted this in August: 
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We need to repeal ObamaCare & replace it w/common-sense 
reforms that lower costs & protect jobs http://is.gd/elL7q 
#gopcodered Tuesday, August 17, 2010 1:40:05 PM via 
TweetDeck  
  This tweet by Representative Boehner is an example of traditional campaigning, 
but could easily be erroneously coded as negative competitive. In this tweet Representative 
Boehner is taking a position, against Obamacare. This position could be seen as a negative 
position because it is a position against an issue that he appropriates to an individual and 
he implies that the position—and thus the individual—lack common sense. However, this 
has to be seen as traditional campaign because it is “prescribing American governmental 
ends” (Mayhew 1974: 61). If, perhaps, Representative Boehner’s tweet read, “We need to 
repeal the Unconstitutional Obamacare & replace it with something that works” this would 
be considered negative competitive because it is extending an attack on the policy, rather 
than simply affirming a position against the policy.  
 Traditional Campaigning 
 The traditional campaigning metric is intended to capture tweets that strictly follow 
what Mayhew (1974) describes as “electorally oriented activities” (p. 73). The activities 
Mayhew is talking about are advertising, credit claiming and position taking. These 
activities are central to understanding the daily activities of Congress, according to 
Mayhew.  
 The first activity I am looking for when coding for traditional campaigning, is 
advertising. Mayhew describes advertising as, “any effort to disseminate one’s name 
among constituents in such a fashion as to create a favorable image but in messages having 
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little or no issue content” (p. 49). Mayhew’s further analysis of advertising is limited by 
the age of his work. The media situation has evolved members of congress now advertise 
online and on television more often than they do in person and on the radio. Because of 
this, I am amending Mayhew’s definition of advertising to, “any effort to disseminate one’s 
name among constituents.” The way members use Twitter to advertise is to refer their 
constituents to appearances they have made in the press, and to opinion pieces they have 
offered in journalism. Further, members use Twitter to inform constituents of events they 
are holding. I am expanding this definition further to include tweets used for Get Out the 
Vote efforts.26 In this line, advertising explicitly political events, such as rallies (in their 
home district or in DC) and funding opportunities are counted under traditional 
campaigning. Moreover, often times members will solicit recommendations from their 
Twitter followers. Asking for “advice” on what they should ask a salient figure in a 
committee meeting, or what programs they should cut. This, too, is considered traditional 
campaigning as it is advertising  
  The second activity I am looking for when coding for traditional campaigning is 
credit claiming. Mayhew describes credit claiming as, “acting so as to generate a belief in 
a relevant political actor…that one is personally responsible for causing the government, 
or some unit thereof, to do something that the actor…considers desirable” (p. 53). For the 
purposes of the present paper, I am interested in capturing whenever a member discusses 
something they have had a part in doing. This is both when a member mentions a bill or 
                                                          
26 I include GOTV efforts as advertising as it is an effort to disseminate campaign relevant 
materials. This could also be seen as positive competitive; however, it remains firmly in 
traditional campaign because these messages do not provide relative gains. 
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law they have personally sponsored, introduced, or make a personal claim to the outcome, 
and when a member makes a mention of the outcome of a committee that they serve.27  
 The third activity I am looking for when coding for traditional campaigning is 
position taking. Mayhew describes position taking as, “public enunciation of a judgmental 
statement on anything likely to be of interest to political actors…important classes of 
judgmental statements are those prescribing American governmental ends…or 
governmental means” (p. 61). For position taking, I am interested in capturing substantive 
issue oriented messages. These messages are simply utilized for the member to get their 
opinion across to their constituents.  
 The activities I am looking to capture are often categorized as information 
dissemination and substantive messaging.28 However, for the present paper, it makes the 
most sense to use the traditional Mayhew definition to avoid overlap among the categories.  
  Examples   
1.Adam Schiff 
I'm hosting a #Small #Business Assistance & Career 
Opportunity Fair on Aug. 11. Register now! 
http://is.gd/dqn38 8:49 AM Jul 13th via web 
 
                                                          
27  Mayhew makes the mention of particularized benefits, and even explicitly cites 
casework. I am not requiring any claim of particularized benefits. This would cause too 
much variation between what I am trying to capture with the presentation of self.  
28 See Flowers, Haynes and Crespin (2003) for a project that divides candidate strategy in 
this way.  
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 Adam Schiff is an experienced Californian Democrat, who was being challenged 
by a tea party candidate. Representative Shciff’s challenger was not very successful. In the 
above tweet—nearly a full 5 months prior to the election—Schiff advertises an event he is 
hosting for small businesses in his district. This actually meets all the requirements for 
Mayhew’s (1974) definition of advertising.29  
  
 2. Al Green 
Where are you voting tomorrow? If you don't know, find out 
by visiting the Harris County Clerk's website: 
http://www.harrisvotes.com/ 5:08 PM Nov 1st via web 
 
 In the above tweet, Representative Green demonstrates that advertising need not be 
candidate centric, and can simply be disseminating information relevant to the campaign.  




                                                          
29 My amendment of the definition is to make it more inclusive to new media outlets, and 




3. Al Green  
As a Member of the House Homeland Security Committee, 
I thank God for the FBI and their work in thwarting the DC 
Metro bomb plot. 3:23 PM Oct 27th via web 
 
 This second tweet from Representative Green provides an interesting example of 
credit claiming. Representative Green, a Democrat from Texas, invokes his committee 
assignment as a means to make the reader think he had something to do with the FBI 
“thwarting” a bomb plot. Notice, this is coded as credit claiming under traditional 
campaigning because Representative Green is specifically mentioning himself and his 
position in concert to an act that is considered desirable.   
  4. David Wu 
I stand with the #LGBT community in celebration of 
national #comingout day. I will ALWAYS be among 
your strongest allies in Congress #pdx Monday, 
October 11, 2010 7:01:27 PM via web 
 
 This tweet by Representative Wu is an interesting example of position taking. Wu, 
an Oregonian Democrat, is displaying his support for a group considered to be 
marginalized. It is important to note that this tweet is coded under traditional campaigning 
as position taking despite failing to meet the requirement of prescribing governmental 
action.  
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 Potential Sources of Variation 
 Mayhew’s original definition is meant to encompass all sources of reelection 
activity. Therefore, it is easy to overuse each subcategory. This category, more than any 
other, requires careful attention. The difference between competitive issue-oriented tweets 
and the substantive issue-oriented tweets is not very large. The underlying difference is the 
intent of the tweet. For a tweet to be considered competitive, it must have aims at a relative 
gain. For example, in the David Wu example above, he is using the tweet as a means of 
explaining his opinion to his constituents. This is purely an informational activity. Had he 
mentioned an endorsement showing his advocacy for the LGBT community, or mentioned 
any reason why the LGBT community benefited from having Representative Wu as an 
ally, this tweet would have been positive competitive. Had he mentioned his challengers 
stance on LGBT issues, this tweet would have been negative competitive.  
 Similar cautionary measure must be taken when analyzing the other subcategories 
of traditional campaigning. Credit claiming can easily be seen as positive competitive. 
Indeed, there needs to be tonal evidence and context to determine the proper coding of the 
tweet. Further, credit claiming must include a specific mention to the member, or the 
member’s affiliation, to the desirable end.30  
 Likewise, advertising and the Presentation of Self are potential sources of overlap 
if not handled with caution. The main distinction I am making the advertising component 
of traditional campaigning and the Presentation of Self is that advertising has an explicitly 
                                                          




political end. Advertising is used for campaign announcements, updates from House 
session, links to media stories, and the like. These all are explicitly meant to “disseminate 
one’s name among constituents.”  
 The Presentation of Self 
 The presentation of self is to be viewed as the way the members present themselves 
in ordinary life. Fenno (2003)—using Goffman’s (1959) definition—emphasizes the 
physical presence required for this behavior. Thus, under the presentation of self variable, 
I am intending to capture the ways in which the members interact with their constituencies. 
For this, I am interested in how the member discusses their family life, their hobbies, their 
friends, and most importantly their constituencies. Often, this will include members talking 
about their constituency service record. As Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina (1987) note, 
constituency service is a vital method used in name recognition and vote share 
maximization. This not tangibly different than any of the other strategies—all of them are 
used to secure reelection, and vote share. This strategy, however, differs in  the fact that it 
is personal rather than political.  
Thus, soliciting casework and discussing a track-record of good casework are 
quintessential cases of the presentation of self I am interesting in capturing. However, most 
of the occurrences of the presentation of self are times in which the member is offering 
congratulations to a favorable entity within their constituency.31 This includes members 
discussing University Rankings, congratulating sports teams, and local events. Further, 
                                                          
31 Often times they will also mention soldiers, or the military even if their constituency 
does not have a military base.  
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soliciting local events are to be counted as presentation of self. The only political 
messaging that is coded under the presentation of self is when a member mentions a 
discussion they had with local people or groups that is assumed to be favorable. This 
messaging is meant to imply that the member works for and with the constituency.  
  Examples 
1. Adam Schiff 
Congrats 2 John Dabiri, this year's youngest recipient of the 
coveted #MacArthurFoundation "genius grants” 
@http://bit.ly/d8YX5l #Caltech Thursday, October 07, 2010 
1:18:37 PM via web 
Congrats to #Armenians around the globe on the 19th 
anniversary of the independence of the #Republic of 
#Armenia. Oorakh Angakhootyan Or! Wednesday, 
September 22, 2010 10:25:38 AM via web 
Congrats to #Caltech on jumping to 2nd place among the 
world's top 200 universities (tho we know they're really no. 
1) @http://is.gd/fjwyT 12:31 PM Sep 20th via web  
 
 These three examples from Adam Schiff are all great examples of what I am trying 
to capture by in the variable for the Presentation of Self. In each instance, Representative 
Schiff tweets support to popular, salient and nonpolitical local issues. Fenno (2003) 
describes two different home styles of the presentation of self. Stating, “Some kind of 
presentation are calculated to reach large numbers of people even if they produce lukewarm 
support. Other kinds of presentation are calculated to produce devoted support, even if they 
do not reach many people” (p. 129). Representative Schiff utilized both strategies. It is 
reasonable to expect that virtually all of Schiff’s constituents have positive feelings towards 
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Cal Tech, and the success of its students and graduates. In contrast, Representative Schiff 
has very few Armenian constituents; however, the independence of the Armenian people 
is naturally of utmost importance to Armenian constituents.  
2. Mike Quigley 
Check out photos of Mike judging Halloween costumes at 
Space Park over the weekend http://fb.me/AOUWPP2t 
Monday, November 01, 2010 1:23:24 PM via Facebook 
  
 It is nearly impossible to have negative feelings towards a Member of Congress 
that takes a night off—2 days before the election—to judge Halloween costumes. 
Especially, when it is the Representative’s first re-election campaign. This tweet both 
exudes confidence for the Chicago Democrat, and it paints Representative Quigley as a 
Representative that is in touch with the community. Unsurprisingly, Representative 
Quigley earned a 70% vote share. 
3. Nancy Pelosi 
Congrats #SFGiants!!! Phenomenal team effort, great pitching! 
#FearTheBeard RT @SFGiants: The @SFGiants are 2010 
World Champs Monday, November 01, 2010 10:52:12 PM via 
Twitter for BlackBerry® 
  
 Like Representative Schiff, Nancy Pelosi tweets congratulations to an extremely 
salient and nonpolitical event that is favorable to her constituents.  
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 Potential Sources of Variation 
 As mentioned above, the difference between advertising and the presentation of self 
are not huge. However, the defining factor of the presentation of self is that it is not 
explicitly political. I am trying to capture tweets that are intended to make the reader think 
that the member is just a regular citizen, or just is trustworthy. These tweets are meant to 
improve the member’s agenda by improving their self-image, rather than improving their 
agenda on the merits of their agenda. 
 Hand coding versus pattern coding 
 This paper utilizes both methods of hand coding, and coding based on patterns in 
the text. Both methods have merit; however, for this paper, both methods do not have equal 
merit. When trying to capture the frequency and conditions relevant for a candidate to 
choose a home style that emphasizes the constituency and the apolitical life of the 
candidate, it is extremely unreliable to look for patterns in the text. Text analysis software 
only yielded one reasonable result, the word congratulations and its variations. Often times, 
members would congratulate constituents, companies in their district, universities in their 
district, and popular sports teams for accomplishments.  
 The reason why it is impossible to code for the tweets I am interested in capturing 
is because each district is different. There is no unifying theme. A researcher interested in 
capturing how members talk about tax policy can easily generate a list to reliably code 
based on textual patterns. The researcher would be able to develop a list—both by their 
own analysis and with text mining software—of the relevant terms and phrases. The 
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researcher can do this because tax policy is tax policy in Peoria, just as it is in Portland. 
However, the constituency of Peoria is different than the constituency of Portland.  
Summary Statistics: 
  Candidate Messaging 
 The data are centered in the middle of a salient midterm election. Unsurprisingly, 
most members used Twitter the most for traditional campaigning. The median share for 
traditional campaigning was 55.88%. This results from a high use of candidates sharing 
their campaign advertisements, and noncompetitive issue-oriented messaging. Presentation 
of Self is the second most frequent style of campaign media, with a median of 14.29%. 
Positive Competitive and Negative Competitive have medians of 8.33% and 8% 
respectively. It is tempting to simplify the variables into Competitive campaigning, 
noncompetitive campaigning, and candidate centric, nonpolitical messaging. 32  If we 
combine the competitive messaging variables, the median becomes 11.25%. Below table 
1 and figures 1 through 4 demonstrate the distribution of these variables. The distribution 
of the variables these plots are reflected in the summary statistics above, and in table 1. 
Plot 1, the density plot for traditional campaigning, shows a basically normal distribution. 
The density plots for presentation of self, positive competitive and negative competitive—
plots 2, 3, and 4, respectively—similarly show a basically normal distribution with outliers. 
This is to be expected, as shown in plot 1, there are some outliers for the total tweets.  
                                                          
32 Indeed, I do combine the variables for competitive campaigning for a model testing 





Table 1, Variable Summary 









Median 55.88 8.33 8 14.29 
     
Mean 57.39 11.3 14.4 16.9 
     
First Quartile 44.44 0 0 3.7 
     
Third Quartile 71.43 16.67 23.53 25 
     
Max 100 50 71.43 100 
     
Standard 
Deviation 
.204558 .1146685 .1681068 .167396 
     




































Using the same regional divisions used by the Economic Census (Census Bureau 
2015), I distributed the home states of each member. The states were distributed four 
regions: Northeast, Midwest, South, and West. The states coded as Northeast include, 
Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, 
Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island. The states coded as Midwest include, Illinois, Indiana, 
Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South 
Dakota, and Wisconsin. The states coded as South include, Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, 
Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, 
South Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas. The states coded as west include, Arizona, Alaska, 
California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, 
Washington, and Wyoming. Figure 5 shows the distribution of Twitter accounts belonging 





Vote Share and District Competitiveness 
The vote share reflects the effectiveness of the campaign. Vote share is used partly 
as a measure of the competitiveness of the race. This is simply measured by the percentage 
of votes each member received in the general election. Of the members analyzed, the 
median vote share was 63.17 percent. Joseph Cao received the lowest vote share of 33.47 
percent. Phil Gingrey and Tom Graves were the only members to run opposed. Joseph Cao, 
Phil Gingrey, and Tom Graves are all Republicans. The standard deviation of the 
distribution is .1333089. Figure 6 shows the distribution of the vote share variable. The 
vote shares are important to the theory because there is evidence that the safety of the 
district changes how the candidate crafts their message (Flowers, Haynes, and Crespin 
2003). Further, members of Congress who think that what allowed them to win the last 
election might not be enough to win their next election will be more likely to risk innovative 
campaign measures and will see a higher benefit for campaigning over Twitter than their 












The vote share distribution is a statistic used by Gainous and Wagner (2014) and 
Wagner, Gainous and Holmon (2014). Wagner, Gainous, and Holmon (2014: 15) describe 
the collection method as,  
District competitiveness was measured by taking the 
absolute value of the difference between the winner’s vote 
total in the previous election and the loser’s vote total in the 
previous elections and then we divided this value by 500,000 
to make the interpretation of estimate clearer.  
 This measure is the primary measurement used in determining the safety of the 
district. Members with a District competitiveness score below 1.3 are considered unsafe. 









I analyze two experience factors, incumbent experience and political experience. 
Incumbent experience captures how long the candidate has held their current office. The 
median for incumbent experience is 10 years. Political experience captures how long the 
candidate has held elected office. The median for political experience is 18 years. The data 
come from Gainous and Wagner (2014) and Gainous, Wagner and Holman (2014). To 
calculate the experience, they gathered the data from the candidates’ websites. Figure 8 












I also look at age, gender, party and ethnicity as variables. For age, I calculated the 
members’ age at the time of the election. I got the data from their website when available; 
if unavailable I googled the member’s name and “age” to extrapolate a birthday.33  
The youngest member analyzed was Aaron Schock, who was 29 at the time of the 
election, and only had 2 years of incumbent experience. The oldest member analyzed was 
84 year old John Dingell, who has held nearly held his seat 56 years—nearly twice as long 
as Aaron Schock has been alive. The median age at time of election was 58 years. Figure 
10 shows the distribution of ages represented in the dataset. Figure 10 is a density plot to 
show the distribution of age. Most of the members observed were White (82%), Male 
(81%) Democrats (57%). The distribution of gender party and ethnicity are shown 
graphically in Figure 11, Figure 12, and Figure 13. In the models, I will use 0-1 dummy 








                                                          





















CHAPTER FOUR: DATA AND ANALYSIS 
 Chapter 5 shows the results of the data. In this section I add to the descriptive 
statistics by showing the correlation of the variables in depth. I run Pearson’s correlation 
on many of the variables to derive; additionally, I use one-way ANOVA tests to show the 
correlation of each variable with the tweeting variables. To test the hypotheses, I use an 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. The regressions I run three sets of models; the 
first model I use the type of tweeting being analyzed as the left-side variable, and for 
controls I use PageRank, incumbent experience, age, ethnicity, gender, party, and district 
competitiveness. The tweeting style in this model is counted as the total number of tweets 
per variable. The second set of models I run uses all the same controls, except I analyze 
the share of tweets that were counted for each variable. Thus, a candidate who tweeted 8 
out of 100 tweets as negative competitive was given a score of 0.08. To control for 
candidates who used Twitter very little, I added a control for the total amount of tweets. 
The third set of models are the exact same as the second model, except I control for the 
vote share as the measure of competitiveness.  
The results of the three sets of models are both very different, and very similar. For 
the first set of models, I find PageRank to be significantly positively correlated with the 
traditional campaign variable, and with the negative competitive variable. Similarly, when 
I look at the shares of tweets, compared to the total number of tweets, I still find the 
traditional campaign variable and the negative competitive variable to be statistically 
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significant; however, I find the presentation of self variable, and the positive competitive 
variable to be significantly negatively correlated.34  
For the second hypothesis, I find only negative competitive to be significantly 
related to district competitiveness when looking at the total numbers of tweets by each 
member. This result holds in the second set of models, but traditional campaign messages 
become significantly negatively correlated with district competitiveness. However, when I 
choose vote share as the measure for the marginality of the member, I find no significant 
difference in tweet style.  
Correlates: 
 This section provides a short description of how each variable correlates with the 
other variables. I look at the interaction between each dummy variable and the variables 
created. These are not ceteris paribus calculations, just basic estimates to serve as more 
advanced descriptive statistics.  
 The first test I run is to understand how party affects the use of each type of political 
messaging. As this is a model with multiple continuous dependent variables, I run a one 
way ANOVA test with the variable for Democrat as the left-side variable. The results of 
this model show that there is a significant relationship between Democrat and both forms 
                                                          
34 It must be noted that Traditional Campaign technically falls outside of the standard 
accepted range of significance, with P=0.0588, in the second set of models. 
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of competitive campaigning.35 Table 2 shows displays the full results. Democrats observed 
are also younger (p=0.001) and had higher district competitiveness (p=0.009). 
Table 2, Tweet Style and Democrat 






F-Value Pr (>F) 
Traditional 
Campaign 
1 0.63 0.635 2.983 0.0861. 
Positive 
Competitive 
1 .95 0.945 4.444 0.0366* 
Negative 
Competitive 




1 0.37 0.375 1.762 0.1863 
 
 This is directly related to the both Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2. Democrats were 
significantly more likely to have a higher PageRank (p=0.049)—and therefore a higher 
salience online—and Democrats were significantly more likely to have a lower vote share 
(p=5.282e-06). The results from Table 2 suggest that I should be able to confirm 
Hypothesis 1, and reject Hypothesis 2. This is not surprising, as Democrats are more likely 
to have younger supporters; therefore for people interested in sharing the thoughts of a 
                                                          
35  From the above test, I can reject the null hypothesis for Positive Competitive and 
Negative Competitive, while accepting the null hypothesis for Traditional Campaigning 
and Presentation of Self.  
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member of Congress, there is more utility for using Twitter as a medium for Democrats 
than for Republicans. Further, the Democrat’s supporters are generally younger, and thus 
more likely to use Twitter. This affects the sharing of the information that is distributed on 
Twitter, and increases the PageRank for Democratic members. 
 The relationship between youth and Twitter usage is important to understand for 
the purposes of this paper.  Indeed, simple correlation testing finds that age is a significant 
factor in the online home style. Younger members are significantly less likely to use 
positive competitive messaging (p=0.044). Further, there is a strong correlation (p=0.006) 
that younger members tweet more. Interestingly, if the measure for youth is changed from 
age to political experience, positive competitive messaging is no longer strongly correlated 
(p=0.069). However, if the measure for youth is incumbent experience, the relationship 
with positive competitive campaigning is stronger (p=0.028). It is important to consider 
the role that experience has on political communication; as Cover (1980) shows, more 
junior members are more likely to embrace mass communication with their constituencies. 
With this literature in mind, I use incumbent experience as the measure for experience in 
the hypothesis testing.  
 It is also important to understand gender differences in Twitter use. Gainous, 
Wagner and Holmon (2014) use the same data set as this paper and find Republican women 
use Twitter to increase their vote share by using Twitter as a mean for attacking. I am 
observing slightly different variables than they are, and find marginally different results as 
shown in Table 3. We both find that Women tweet more than men, however we find a 
different distribution of usage of each type of campaigning, specifically negative 
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campaigning. The difference simply arises from the differences in population.36 None of 
the differences in the means are statistically significant. As for other correlations, I found 
no differences between the genders for district competitiveness, vote share or PageRank.  
Table 3, Means of Tweeting Style by Gender 
 Men Women 
Mean, Total Tweets 77.78 89.6 
Mean, Negative Competitive 5.31 (15.21) 3.08(11.17) 
Mean, Presentation of Self  5.51(16.69) 7.16(18.15) 
Mean, Traditional 15.63 (57.8) 16.29 (54.8) 
Mean, Positive Competitive 3.12 (10.43) 3.72 (15.29) 
   
Source: All means are not trimmed and are rounded two decimal places. In parentheses are 
the proportions that the means represent. 
Hypothesis Testing and Results:37 
 Hypothesis 1: The more salient the member, the more likely he or she is to tweet 
using competitive campaigning. 
 For the purpose of testing hypothesis 1, I use the PageRank as a proxy measure of 
salience. The PageRank uses an algorithm developed by Sergey and Page (1998) to 
determine how often the page is cited on other pages. Since PageRank calculates the 
                                                          
36 Looking at their data for the members observed in this paper, Men used attack at a 
marginally higher rate than women—which is consistent with my findings.  
37 All statistical guidance was derived from Angrist and Pischke (2009), Wooldrige (2002) 
and discussions with members on my thesis committee.  
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probability that a “random surfer” visits the page, PageRank is a useful measure for 
calculating the salience on the web.38 For the model used to calculate the effects PageRank, 
I use dummy variables for Male, White, Age, and Democrat. Further, I include all 
theoretically relevant variables. This includes district competitiveness and incumbent 
experience. To test hypothesis 1, I use an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. Tables 
4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 show the results of the models. 
 As shown in tables 5, 6 and 8, the hypothesis is partially rejected. Candidates who 
use Twitter for negative competitive messaging (p=0.014) and traditional campaign 
messaging (p=0.008) are more likely to have a higher PageRank. However, if the same 
model is tested for the sum of competitive messages (positive competitive + negative 
competitive), the support for hypothesis 1 falls through (p=0.677).  
 Interestingly, however, I find further complications for hypothesis 1 when I use the 
share of tweets instead of the total number of tweets. As shown in tables 9, 10, 13, and 14 
I find the presentation of self and positive competitive to be negative correlated at 
significant levels.39 Making substantive statements on the issues are certainly not captured 
in the presentation of self variable, and are only captured under positive competitive in 
certain circumstances. These results reinforce the rejection of hypothesis one.  
                                                          
38 The Oxford English Dictionary defines Salience as “most notable or important” (Oxford 
English Dictionary of English 2010) PageRank calculates the circulation of the webpage. 
The major problems with using PageRank as a measure for salience is that it can be 
manipulated through link farming. 
39 For presentation of self, with district competitiveness as a dependent variable, P=0.006; 
with vote share as a dependent variable, p=0.013.  
For positive competitive, with district competitiveness as a dependent variable, p=0.012; 
with vote share as the dependent variable, p=0.001 
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Existing campaign literature is consistent with this finding. In an analysis of press 
releases during a Presidential primary, Flowers, Haynes and Crespin (2003) find that 
competitive campaign messages are not significantly more likely to find its way into the 
broader media. Stating that competitive campaign messages do no “significantly influence 
either the media’s coverage of the campaign or attention to the candidate” (Flowers, 
Haynes and Crespin, 2003: 272).  In a more modern study of online communication Hong 
and Nadler (2012) note, candidate salience online is more about the media, than about 
candidates themselves.  
Thus, the results from the models are not surprising. Rather than candidates crafting 
a message for the size of their audience, as the original theory argues, candidates rather 
increase their PageRank by advertising their campaign and the daily happenings of 
Washington. This increases their PageRank because the national news, local news, and 
politically active social media users then turn to Twitter for this information. As Terkildsen, 
Frauke and Ling (1998) point out, media members frame stories the way the stories are 
presented to them.  
Similarly, negative campaigning is associated with a high PageRank. This is likely 
for the reasons stated in Chapter 2. It makes sense for party leadership, and other salient 
members, to use Twitter as a way of rallying supporters in an iconoclast us versus them 
mentality. Doing this, high salient members do not risk loosing the support of their political 
base by taking stances on tough issues.  
On the negative correlations side, it makes sense that candidates with a high 
PageRank do not use Twitter for a significant share of the presentation of self. As noted in 
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Chapter 2, candidate centric media strategies are generally reserved for more marginal 
members. Further, salience, as calculated by PageRank, is largely a measure of how often 
people link back to a member’s profile. It seems unlikely that a large amount of members 
of the media are going to report on a member who just ate a cheese steak at a locally famous 
shop.  
Similarly with positive competitive, members often use positive competitive tweets 
to show links describing themselves as the frontrunner, or showing a poll showing that a 
stance they take is very popular. Therefore often times the members are linking stories 
from the media,  or discussing things that have already gone through a media cycle. This 
means that members of the media are not going to have any use with the representatives’ 
tweets.  
 Limitations to this model: 
Careful readers will note that in Chapter 2, I made the argument that salient 
candidates do not have incentives to take firm stances on issues. By taking stances on the 
issues, candidates risk alienation by those who disagree. Thus, candidates—by my 
estimation—should  use Twitter to talk about their accomplishments and their opponents’ 
shortcomings. The results of this model find traditional campaigning significantly related 
to PageRank, and one of the components to the traditional campaigning variable is position 
taking. Above, I explain the significance of traditional campaigning as  it relates to 
advertising. That is really the most consistent finding with the literature (Flowers, Hayes 
and Crespin, 2003).   
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This hypothesis would have been better tested with subcategories for position 
taking or substantive messaging and advertising or campaign related messaging. If such a 
model shows that candidates with a high PageRank use both subcategories of traditional 
campaigning significantly more, it would have been a more conclusive rejection of 
Hypothesis 1. However, it such a model shows that candidates with a high PageRank only 
use advertising significantly more, it would suggest that my estimation of candidates’ 
incentives was flawed. Rather than being competitive as a substitute for discussing policy, 














Table 4, Presentation of Self 
 Estimate Standard 
Error 
T Value Pr(>l t l) 
Intercept 18.51812 6.11092 3.030 0.00287** 
District Competitiveness -0.41988 0.46520 -0.903 0.36817 
White -1.26323 2.09126 -0.604 0.54670 
Male -2.13735 2.02530 -1.055 0.29294 
Democrat -1.91478 1.68675 -1.135 0.25807 
Age -0.20104 0.09326 -2.156 0.03267* 
Incumbent Experience 0.11116 0.10999 1.011 0.31380 
PageRank 0.69592 0.62094 1.121 0.26415 
     











Table 5, Positive Competitive 
 Estimate Standard 
Error 
T Value Pr(>l t l) 
Intercept 4.10560 2.83976 1.466 0.1503 
District Competitiveness -0.14883 0.21618 -0.688 0.4922 
White 0.27289 0.97181 0.281 0.7792 
Male -0.44574 0.94116 -0.474 0.6365 
Democrat 0.43797 0.78384 0.599 0.5772 
Age -0.04811 0.04334 -1.110 0.2687 
Incumbent Experience 0.02549 0.05111 0.499 0.6188 
PageRank 0.49344 0.28855 1.710 0.0893. 
     











Table 6, Negative Competitive 
 Estimate Standard 
Error 
T Value Pr(>l t l) 
Intercept 5.43823 5.00632 1.086 0.27908 
District Competitiveness -0.83703 0.38176 -2.193 0.02986* 
White  2.12634 1.71374 1.241 0.21661 
Male 0.73106 1.6617 0.440 0.66050 
Democrat -3.74459 1.38772 -2.698 0.00776** 
Age -0.06860 0.07639 -0.898 0.37058 
Incumbent Experience 0.07898 0.09012 0.876 0.38218 
PageRank 1.25989 0.50937 2.473 0.01448** 
     











Table 7, Traditional Campaign 
 Estimate Standard 
Error 
T Value Pr(>l t l) 
Intercept 19.990088 10.05464 1.988 0.04857 
District Competitiveness -0.12230 0.76542 -0.160 0.87326 
White -1.34056 3.44087 -0.390 0.69737 
Male 0.56082 3.33233 0.168 0.86657 
Democrat -3.66224 2.77531 -1.320 0.18895 
Age -0.22863 0.15344 -1.490 0.13829 
Incumbent Experience 0.09706 0.18097 0.536 0.5923 
PageRank 2.72415 1.02166 2.666 0.00849** 
     










Table 8, Share of Positive Competitive and Negative Competitive 
 Estimate Standard 
Error 
T Value Pr(>l t l) 
Intercept 35.44389 12.38209 2.863 0.00479** 
District Competitiveness -1.66086 0.94259 -1.762 0.08007. 
White 2.83444 4.23736 0.669 0.50456 
Male -2.00330 4.10370 -0.488 0.62613 
Democrat -4.43685 3.41774 -1.298 0.19618 
Age -0.09699 0.18896 -0.513 0.60851 
Incumbent Experience 0.05247 0.2286 0.35 0.81419 
PageRank 0.52506 1.25816 0.417 0.67703 
     











Table 9, Share of Presentation of Self 
 Estimate Standard 
Error 
T Value Pr(> l t l) 
Intercept 37.88803 10.98330 3.450 0.000727*** 
District Competitiveness -0.19336 0.79886 -0.242 0.809076 
White -1.11033 3.570011 -0.311 0.756215 
Male -2.92286 3.47644 -0.841 0.401802 
Democrat 4.51873 2.92977 1.542 0.0125068 
Age -1.18045 0.16312 -1.106 0.270364 
Incumbent Experience -0.05784 0.19085 -0.303 0.762230 
PageRank -2.97121 1.06612 -2.787 0.006000** 
Total Tweets 0.03790 0.01491 2.541 0.012053* 
     










Table 10, Share of Positive Competitive 
 Estimate Standard 
Error 
T Value Pr(> l t l) 
Intercept 17.622437 7.092389 2.485 0.01405* 
District Competitiveness 0.233038 0.515861 0.452 0.65210 
White  0.811518 2.305311 0.352 0.72531 
Male -3.483986 2.244886 -1.552 0.12275 
Democrat 7.238603 1.891881 3.826 0.00019*** 
Age -0.024883 0.105332 -0.236 0.81357 
Incumbent Experience -0.040001 0.123237 -0.325 0.74594 
PageRank -1.742489 0.688441 -2.531 0.01239* 
Total Tweets -0.002862 0.009630 -0.297 0.76671 
     










Table 11, Share of Negative Competitive 
 Estimate Standard 
Error 
T Value Pr(> l t l) 
Intercept 18.003677 10.100060 1.783 0.0767. 
District Competitiveness -1.898613 0.734622 -2.5841 0.0107* 
White 2.017908 3.282942 0.615 0.5397 
Male 1.460874 3.196876 0.457 0.6483 
Democrat -11.704313 2.694172 -4.344 2.54e-05*** 
Age -0.073995 0.015000 -0.493 0.6255 
Incumbent Experience 0.094294 0.175498 0.537 0.5919 
PageRank 2.273753 0.980388 2.319 0.0217* 
Total Tweets 0.002074 0.013714 0.151 0.8800 
     










Table 12, Share of Traditional Campaign  
 Estimate Standard 
Error 
T Value Pr(> l t l) 
Intercept 26.485859 13.202256 2.006 0.0466* 
District Competiveness 1.858931 0.960259 1.936 0.0547. 
White -1.719099 4.291262 -0.401 0.6893 
Male 4.945971 4.178784 1.184 0.2384 
Democrat -0.053025 3.521676 0.015 0.9880 
Age 0.279328 0.196072 1.425 0.1563 
Incumbent Experience 0.003551 0.229402 0.015 0.9877 
PageRank 2.439946 1.281511 1.904 0.0588. 
Total Tweets -0.037107 0.017926 -2.070 0.0401* 
     










Table 13, Share of Presentation of Self with Vote Share   
 Estimate Standard 
Error 
T Value Pr(> l t l) 
Intercept 35.10821 13.95647 2.516 0.0129* 
Vote Share -0.73616 11.32390 -0.065 0.9483 
White -0.95085 3.70131 -0.257 0.7976 
Male -1.88112 3.43647 -0.547 0.5849 
Democrat 3.91327 3.35747 1.166 0.2456 
Age -0.17124 0.16316 -1.050 0.2956 
Incumbent Experience -0.06492 0.18241 -0.356 0.7224 
PageRank -2.58373 1.03107 -2.506 0.0133* 
Total Tweets 0.03749 0.01523 2.461 0.0150 
     










Table 14, Share of Positive Competitive with Vote Share 
 Estimate Standard 
Error 
T Value Pr(> l t l) 
Intercept 25.715494 9.088806 2.829 0.00529** 
Vote Share -3.023604 7.374412 -0.410 0.68237 
White -0.847952 2.410386 -0.352 0.72548 
Male -4.504730 2.237914 -2.013 0.04588* 
Democrat 6.843673 2.186468 3.130 0.00209** 
Age -0.046059 0.106252 -0.433 0.66527 
Incumbent Experience 0.027923 0.118792 -0.235 0.81448 
PageRank -2.147514 0.671459 -3.198 0.00168** 
Total Tweets -0.005473 0.009920 -0.552 0.58196 
     










Table 15, Share of Negative Competitive with Vote Share 
 Estimate Standard 
Error 
T Value Pr(> l t l) 
Intercept 19.376268 12.857678 1.507 0.1339 
Vote Share -13.687609 10.432373 -1.312 0.1915 
White 4.136871 3.409905 1.213 0.2269 
Male 1.414241 3.165914 0.447 0.6577 
Democrat -13.328083 3.093135 -4.309 2.92e-05*** 
Age -0.042781 0.168051 -0.285 0.7763 
Incumbent Experience 0.010525 0.168051 0.063 0.9501 
PageRank 2.248283 0.949894 2.367 0.0192* 
Total Tweets 0.004529 0.014034 0.323 0.7473 
     










Table 16, Share of Traditional Campaign with Vote Share  
 Estimate Standard 
Error 
T Value Pr(> l t l) 
Intercept 19.80003 16.81341 1.178 0.2408 
Vote Share 17.44737 13.64195 1.279 0.2029 
White -2.33806 4.45898 -0.524 0.6008 
Male 4.94161 4.13992 1.201 0.2316 
Democrat 2.57114 4.04475 0.636 0.5259 
Age 0.26008 0.19656 1.323 0.1878 
Incumbent Experience 0.08232 0.21975 0.375 0.7085 
PageRank 2.48296 1.24213 1.999 0.0474* 
Total Tweet -0.03655 0.01835 -1.992 0.0482* 
     












 Hypothesis 2: Members in unsafe districts are more likely to use the presentation 
of self. 
For the purpose of testing hypothesis 2, I use district competitiveness to measure 
for marginality or safety.40 I choose district competitiveness as it is the same measure used 
in the literature (Cover 1980; Cain, Ferejohn and Fiornina 1987; 1983). As stated above, 
district competitiveness is measured by taking the absolute value of the difference between 
the winner’s vote share and the loser’s vote share. To test hypothesis 2, I use the models 
above and from these models I also fail hypothesis 2. In fact, surprisingly, I find that 
marginal members are significantly more likely to use Twitter for negative competitive 
messaging.  
 The first estimate, as shown in Table 4, shows that the only significant relationship 
to the presentation of self is age. Younger members are significantly more likely to use the 
presentation of self than their older colleagues. However, this relationship does not exist 
when we consider youth as incumbent experience, as is consistent with the literature. In 
fact, no tweeting styles are significantly related to incumbent experience. This estimate 
does not change when testing for the share of the presentation of self.  
The failing of this hypothesis is a change from existing literature. Adler, Gent and 
Overmeyer (1998) find in the early stages of Internet research, that the decisions to solicit 
casework online is strongly correlated with the safety of the district.41 This is consistent 
                                                          
40 Throughout the paper, I use “marginal” and “unsafe” interchangeably.  
41 Many studies before the use of Internet communication have discussed the conditions 
present for constituency service and constituency contact (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 
1983; 1987; Cover 1980; Epstein and Frankovich 1982). My findings contradict their 
80 
 
with older studies that find constituency service as an effective way for marginal members 
to increase their favorable characteristics among their constituents.  
 The most reasonable explanation for this negative result is that ease of Twitter has 
not translated into an effective means of constituency service. Put another way, there still 
lies utility for members to utilize mailings and email lists to solicit constituency contact. 
Twitter use during a campaign is impersonal; the tweets are cast out to a large audience, 
rather than to individuals. Therefore, it makes sense for candidates to use Twitter for other 
forms of communication to do things like soliciting casework as they can design the 
message to a more targeted audience.   
 However, I did find that members in competitive districts were significantly more 
likely to use negative competitive messaging. As a casual observer of elections, this result 
is not surprising; negative competitive messaging is a means of attaining a relative 
advantage on an opponent, and it allows the attacker to set the narrative because the 
opponent often is forced to respond. From an academic perspective, the findings are less 
clear. Skaperdas and Grofman (1995) model negative campaigning and find that the 
frontrunner has less of an incentive to go negative than the underdog.  
 Unfortunately, Skaperdas and Grofman do not look at the incentives for incumbents 
and their nonincumbent opponents. Similarly in an empirical study of U.S. Senate 
elections, Lau and Pomper (2002) find that negative campaign strategies are useful 
strategies for challengers. Further, in a meta-analysis Lau, Sigelman and Rovner (2007) 
                                                          
results, though they do not invalidate them. Twitter has simply not been used as a medium 
to interact with constituencies at the rate that their findings might suggest.  
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find evidence that negative campaigning is not an effective method of increasing a 
candidate’s vote-share.  
The most significant piece providing explanation of my results is Theilmann and 
Whilhite (1998). In an experiment with political consultants as the population, Theilmann 
and Whilhite find that negative messaging is a predictable strategy when incumbents are 
in a close race, or are losing (Theilmann and Whilhite 1998: 1055). My evidence 
corroborates Theilmann and Whilite, but provides little to the overall literature on negative 
messaging.  
Interestingly, when I look at the share of tweets—rather than the total number of 
tweets—I find that the share of negative competitive tweets come from the share of 
traditional competitive tweets. This is counterintuitive as there seems to be incentives for 
members in a tight race to mobilize their supporters by advertising get out the vote efforts. 
However, when considering the variable as a whole, it shows that members use negative 
competitive messaging as a substitute for substantive messaging when in close races.   
 Limitations to the model: 
The major limitation of the model is the length of time that the data were collected. 
It is reasonable to expect candidate behavior to change over the course of the session, and 
it is entirely possible that over the course of the entire session that I would have found 
different results. It is debatable how significant this limitation is. After all, this is paper is 
looking at an election therefore data from outside the election season are not relevant. 
However, Cover’s (1980) seminal study studies the entire session. Further, it would make 
sense to understand incumbent behavior leading to the election, as incumbents are 
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primarily interested in reelection. In Chapter 5, I discuss potential problems with my 
definitions that might have biased my sample. In essence, I used a narrower definition of 
the presentation of self than the rest of the literature, which might have taken positive 
effects out of the model.  
Discussion about the models: 
The three sets of models I test find very similar results for hypothesis 1. The models 
are simply looking at the same variables but in different ways. The most significant 
difference in the sets of models is the significance of traditional campaign messaging and 
PageRank. The estimates are all basically the same, but as shown in Table 12 and Table 16 
the significance becomes much weaker. Indeed, in Table 12, there is technically not a 
significant relationship. Similarly, the relationship of negative competitive becomes 
marginally weaker for PageRank. However, the relationship becomes marginally stronger 
when looking at district competitiveness for hypothesis 2.  
This is not worrisome; the most important set of models is the first as I am most 
interested in the actual amount of tweets members’ make when they are reaching a large 
audience, or when they are in a competitive election. It is not as important to understand 
the share of tweets. A member tweeting 3 out of 5 tweets as negative competitive is not the 
same as a member  tweeting 30 out of 100 tweets as negative competitive, because the 
frequency is higher for the second member. When I am looking at the share of tweets, the 
first member appears to use Twitter twice as much for negative competitive messaging as 
the second member. Further, the results stay basically the same. Negative competitive and 
traditional campaign remains positively correlated with PageRank and negative 
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competitive stays positively correlated with district competitiveness. The difference 
between the sets of models is the negative correlation for positive competitive and 
presentation of self with PageRank. This is not surprising, as I am using PageRank as a 
metric of salience, and other users are not likely to disseminate a candidate’s tweet 
proclaiming that they had a good cheese steak at a mom and pop restaurant in their district. 
Users are also not likely to disseminate a candidate’s tweet when the candidate is 
proclaiming that they have a big lead in the race. People looking to disseminate information 
consistent with the positive competitive variable, are likely to look for a more 
comprehensive source than a 140 character tweet.  
The third set of models are equally underwhelming as the theory behind hypothesis 
two was about the safety of the district, not about the outcome of the election. All the 
literature cited uses a similar measure to measure for district competitiveness. The third set 
of models might corroborate previous literature doubting the efficacy of negative 
campaigning, as they show that members who are in competitive campaigns are more likely 
to go negative, but are not likely to benefit from going negative. However, there is little 










CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION 
 Introduction: 
 In the conclusion, I first discuss the findings of this paper contrasted with previous 
literature, and explore theories as to why I had non-results. I discuss the non-results for 
hypothesis 1 by considering the possibility that variable selection was suboptimal. To 
discuss non-results for hypothesis 2, I consider that the direction that the variables I coded 
might have been too narrow to capture the effects I was testing for. Then, I discuss how 
this paper fits in the Political Science literature. I summarize that hypothesis 1 does little 
for the literature. Hypothesis 2, however, provides a blow to a large literature and suggests 
that further research must be done to understand the nature of the presentation of self.  
 Discussion of results: 
Absent of positive results, this paper makes an important point about candidate 
messaging on social networks. It shows that, with near uniformity, a majority of the time 
candidates use social media for civil political use. They use it to disseminate information 
about upcoming campaign events, about the daily political events in Washington, and about 
their own stances on salient issues. Therefore, I can conclude that the home styles projected 
by members of Congress are not dissimilar to what Fenno describes. Members are trying 
to project that they are working for their constituents (Fenno 2003). They using Twitter to 
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hold rallies for constituents to show their support, they hold town hall meetings to get 
feedback from their constituents. 
 The degree that members use Twitter for traditional campaign activities was 
surprising; it was expected that there would be a greater share of Twitter usage focused on 
candidates’ desirable traits and focused on building a relationship with the constituency. 
Advertising political events or taking a stance on an issue on Twitter is impersonal. Twitter 
is a relatively personal form of communication, where members go to share their thoughts 
and cat pictures.  I expected the Twitter usage by members of Congress to be significantly 
closer to the median Twitter user’s usage. In other words, the expectation was for the Home 
Style projected to be more candidate centric, personal and focused on reputation building.  
However, my expectations for the shares of Twitter usage is not the reason why this 
project failed to yield positive results. For Hypothesis 1, I used PageRank to determine 
whether salient members tweeted differently than nonsalient members. The literature to 
support this hypothesis is very slim. The literature that inspired hypothesis 1, and that I 
used to describe hypothesis 1, are formal theoretic models on candidate ambiguousness. 
This literature describes the incentives for candidates to make issues more salient by taking 
a firm stance on the issue. The literature fairly uniformly shows that there are not sufficient 
incentives for candidates to be specific when talking about issues. This lead me to believe 
that position taking and credit claiming, or substantive messaging, would be much less 
likely to occur. Further, high salience members do not have sufficient incentive to use this 
form of communication, as it would only give their adversaries an opportunity to attack 
them. Therefore, high salience members’ incentives are to use Twitter to make themselves 
look like they deserve to be a ranking member or a party leader. High salience members 
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also theoretically have incentives to use Twitter to attack their adversaries, as it will have 
a greater impact because it will reach more people.  
However, it appears candidates do not agree with my theoretical understandings of 
their incentives. There is a possibility that I was not looking at Hypothesis 1 correctly. 
PageRank calculates how often the page is linked to. As Hong and Nadler (2012) show, a 
candidates’ salience online is correlated with new coverage of the candidate. Therefore, it 
might have been more useful to look at the tweet styles that are more likely to get news 
coverage. However, had I used that model, it would have yielded similar results. As shown 
above, members use Twitter significantly as a means of traditional campaigning. Further, 
Flower, Haynes and Crespin (2003) show that most of the campaign messaging that is 
picked up by the news media are campaign announcements. However, Flowers, Haynes 
and Crespin are investigating a Presidential primary, not a Congressional session. 
Therefore, it is likely that the media will rely much less on individual members from the 
dataset, than Flowers, Hayes and Crespin found.  
PageRank is also possibly a bad measure for salience. PageRank is calculated on a 
0-10 scale—every page on the web fits on this scale. 125 of the 180 members analyzed had 
either a 4 or a 5. It is possible that this scale hides the actual effects of salience as so many 
members are grouped so closely together. However, I also had data for the Alexa traffic 
rank, which is a Google Chrome extension that measures traffic to the webpage and the 
amount of pages that link to the page. The Alexa rank offers a much more specific number 
than PageRank; however, there are no major differences in the model when Alexa is 
substituted for PageRank.  
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A final conjecture about the failure of hypothesis 1 was that I was looking at the 
variables incorrectly. Advertising political events, news appearances, and the like, are very 
much a way to avoid making unequivocal stances on issues. When building the model, I 
dismissed this notion because at political events members are likely to take firm stances 
and to vary away from an ambiguous strategy. I did not have data on this, however. There 
is no way to determine—5 years later—whether a candidate utilized an ambiguous strategy 
in each event that they advertised on Twitter.  
Even if I had that data, the traditional campaign variable is problematic as a means 
of testing an ambiguous strategy. To test advertising as an ambiguous strategy, it would 
have to be decoupled from the unequivocal strategies of position taking and credit 
claiming.  
Nevertheless, when considering the proportions of tweets, rather than the overall 
tweets, I find positive competitive and negative competitive to be negatively correlated. 
This might further suggest that the theory is backwards. Candidates that reach a large 
audience might actually be tweeting significantly more to take stances on the issues, as a 
means of controlling the narrative in Washington. However, to determine the exact nature 
of this, further research is warranted. 
There are possible avenues for research for Hypothesis 1. For example, it would be 
interesting to empirically test the formal theories about candidate ambiguity with a similar 
method. To test this, one would simply need to analyze both the messaging used by 
challengers and incumbents and perform a content analysis. Twitter would not be able to 
be the only source of data; the researcher would have to also look at speeches and campaign 
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releases. The model would probably be best suited for a Presidential primary, rather than 
for a congressional election as there is a higher frequency of public statements which would 
make it easier to track the aggregate strategies of the candidate. The only problem would 
arise in determining how to model for issues never brought to salience by the incumbent 
or frontrunner that Glazer and Lohmann (1999) discuss. Even if there is not an effective 
way to capture this in the model, it would still be interesting to see the conditions present 
for a candidate to get specific on an issue and which issues come to salience in the 
campaign cycle. 
Rejecting Hypothesis 2 was especially surprising. There is plenty of generalizable 
literature to suggest that marginal members would use Twitter to engage their constituency, 
and solicit casework. It simply was not represented in the data. One additional reason might 
be that often times members would simply share links with the title of the link. If it was 
clear what type of messaging strategy was being used, I would count it as such. If not, or 
if the link had no context and was broken, I would simply skip it as there would be no way 
of determining which category it belonged to. Often times, I suspect, these links were links 
to photo albums of constituency visits, and links to inspiring stories about their 
constituents. With more recent data where I would be able to check the links, there might 
have been a different result.  
However, the result postulated in the body of the text are still valid. There is no 
possibility of measurement error, as with hypothesis 1. However, it would be interesting to 
do the same model but with data from Facebook, as Facebook gives members the ability 
to tell longer stories by providing its members with an unlimited character count for its 
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posts. It might, then, be more effective to use Facebook for constituency service and 
constituency contact.  
Nevertheless, there is the likelihood that the variables I used were too narrowly 
focused, as mentioned in Chapter 2, the seminal study on which hypothesis 2 was based, 
started with a much broader definition, looking at “personal qualities, qualifications, 
activities, and record” (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiornia, 1987:9). Personal qualities and 
activities are certainly captured under my variable “the presentation of self” but 
qualifications were mostly counted as positive competitive, and depending on the context 
and tone, record was coded as either positive competitive, traditional campaigning, or the 
presentation of self. This method of coding is a little unorthodox in traditional content 
analyses. I am confident in my assumptions that the reader of the tweets will be able to 
discern context from the members’ tweets. Users who are likely to follow members of 
Congress are likely to be politically informed enough to understand the tone and context 
of the tweets. Nevertheless, this subjectivity of the coding did result in much variation 
between the positive competitive and the traditional campaign variables. In fact, nearly all 
the variation between my reading of the tweets, and the second reader’s reading of the 
tweets came from this subjectivity. Using Scott’s Pi as a coefficient of determination, I am 
not worried that the subjectivity of my variables biased the results.  
Further, the definition I used was even narrower than a narrow reading of Fenno’s 
(2003) definition of the presentation of self. An important part of the presentation of self 
for Fenno was qualification. When a member used Twitter to look more qualified, I coded 
it as positive competitive. I chose to do this because, as Fenno notes, the qualification 
component is more important for the challenger or nonincumbent (Fenno 2003:57). 
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Further, it is hard to imagine a situation near an election in which a member is flaunting 
their qualifications without a competitive motive. Indeed, if there were a mention of 
qualifications that did not come off as competitive, it would have been coded as the 
presentation of self.   
Furthermore, I do not agree with Fenno’s three-pronged approach for trust. 
Qualification is categorically different than identification and empathy. The latter two, 
make the member look like they are “one of us” and helps the member identify with the 
constituency. Qualification, however, separates the member from the constituency. 
Qualification makes the member seem elite, and as one that the constituents can look up 
to.  Sure, some degree of balance of the three is the optimal trust maximization strategy; 
however, qualification intensive messaging is intended to provide relative political gains 
against opponents, where identification and empathy is a more personal, nonpolitical 
messaging. Had I used a broader definition—that is fully comprehensive of Cain Ferejohn 
and Fiorina (1987) and Fenno (2003)—there is a possibility of a different, positive, result.  
The negative competitive significance was a little surprising. The best conjecture is 
that campaigns are run by professional political consultants, and not by academics who 
understand the effects of negative campaigning. My results provide the most significant 
contribution to Theilmann and Whilhite (1998) whose analysis is based on a survey of 
political consultants. The actual aggregate data analysis of negative competitive 
campaigning is mixed at best on its utility for incumbents. If anything, the nonresults of 
the third set of models show that negative campaigning might be the likely strategy, but it 
is not necessarily the effective strategy.  
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The Literature as a whole: 
The two hypotheses tested both provide insight into the Political Science literature. 
Hypothesis 1 was mostly an attempt at empirically testing a formal theory. In all, it did not 
work. It was not surprising that it did not work, as there is empirical work on campaign 
media that finds similar results about salience and issue-framing (Hong and Nadler 2012). 
Further, the model was too simple to test candidate strategy against the literature of 
ambiguousness. It would have required a much more sophisticated econometric analysis. 
Moreover, to properly empirically test the literature of ambiguousness, I would have 
needed district level attitudinal data that I did not have access to. To test this hypothesis 
most effectively, it might be better to do a time series analysis of a Presidential primary, as 
there would be better attitudinal data readily available.  
Hypothesis 2, however, provides a great deal of insight into the Political Science 
literature. Every piece of literature, spanning decades, suggests that marginal members 
should have more tweets fall into presentation of self category. But, the test failed. 
Assuming the decisions I made about data collection was not the primary reason why the 
test failed, the failed result opens a lot of questions. Are safer members contacting 
constituents more because the cost is lower due to the expansion of the Internet, while 
marginal members’ contact levels have stayed constant? Or, has Twitter not yet been 
adopted to improve the presentation of self? Finally, has the nature of elections changed so 
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